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The Minnesota Federal Estate Tax Apportionment
Statute: Directing Against Its Application
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal estate tax1 is imposed on the transfer of assets
includible in decedent's gross estate to his distributee.2 Absent
statutory provision for apportionment of this tax, payment of the
tax is generally made from the residue of the estate, often de-
priving the residuary beneficiaries of much or all of their inter-
est in the estate.3 Such a result may contravene the distribution
intended by the testator, especially when the residuary bene-
ficiaries are testator's spouse, issue, or close relatives. Conse-
quently, states have enacted statutes on federal estate tax ap-
portionment, such as the one existing in Minnesota since 1961, 4
to provide a means for distributing the estate tax burden
among beneficiaries in a manner presumed to be consistent with
the testator's intent.5
The presumption of the apportionment statute will not, how-
1. The executor is liable for the payment of the tax. INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, §§ 2002, 2203-05; Treas. Reg. § 20.2002-1 (1954), as
amended, T.D. 6600, 1962-1 Cum. BuL,. 164; Alu. STAT. § 291.12(4)
(1965). The tax is paid out of the estate assets before distribution.
INT. R v. CODE Of 1954, § 2205; Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 345-46
(1945); Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 97-98 (1942).
2. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2001-02; see Mayer v. Reinecke, 130
F.2d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1942). The federal estate tax is imposed upon
the privilege of transferring property; the state inheritance tax is im-
posed upon the privilege of receiving it. See, e.g., State v. Wagner, 233
Minn. 241, 250, 46 N.W.2d 676, 682 (1951).
Both property passing under a will and many nontestamentary as-
sets are includible in decedent's gross estate. Thus the federal estate
tax is imposed on gifts in contemplation of death, life insurance pro-
ceeds, inter vivos trusts intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment after death, life trusts subject to revocation, joint tenancy prop-
erty, and property subject to certain powers of appointment. See
INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, §§ 2031-44.
3. Comment, Federal Estate Tax Apportionment, 16 DEPAuL L.
REv. 112 (1966).
4. lhqN. STAT. §§ 525.521-.527 (1965).
5. The landmark decision in Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95
(1942), set the stage for the passage of state statutes on apportionment
by holding that the New York apportionment statute was constitu-
tional. The Supreme Court stated:
[Congress] did not undertake in any manner to specify who
was to bear the burden of the tax. Its legislative history indi-
cates clearly that Congress did not contemplate that the Gov-
ernment would be interested in the distribution of the estate
after the tax was paid, and that Congress intended that state
law should determine the ultimate thrust of the tax.
Id. at 98.
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ever, be identical with testator's intent in all cases. If it is not, a
testator can prevent the application of the state apportionment
statute by express direction in his will.6 It is difficult, however,
to draft a direction against statutory apportionment in such a
way as to avoid litigation under the statute. It is the purpose
of this Note to delineate the estate planning problems which
exist with respect to the apportionment statute, and to indicate
effective means of drafting a direction against apportionment.
II. DEVELOPMENT AND MECHANICS OF
APPORTIONMENT
The federal estate tax was originally treated as a debt of
decedent's estate, to be paid out of the residue.7 For example,
the Minnesota rule, established in In re Estate of Gelin,8 was
that the federal estate tax should be paid out of the residue of
the estate, and that no tax be assessed against property be-
queathed or devised unless the residue was insufficient to pay
the tax. As the burden of the federal estate tax increased,
however, some courts rejected the pay-out-of-residue treatment
in favor of apportionment of the tax burden among the persons
entitled to receive assets of the decedent, on the ground that
nonapportionment would deplete the residuary estate and,
therefore, was an inequitable burden on the residuary benefici-
aries." The policy of spreading the estate tax burden in a pro-
portionate manner was the object of the first state apportion-
ment statute,10 enacted in New York in 1930.11 The Minnesota
apportionment statute follows the New York statute with little
more than formal changes. 12 The Minnesota statute on in-
6. MINN. STAT. § 525.521 (1965).
7. See, e.g., Brown's Estate v. Hoge, 198 Iowa 373, 199 N.W. 320
(1924); Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144 Kan. 79, 58 P.2d 469 (1936);
Lauritzen, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 1 TAx CoxsFLoR's
Q. 55 (1957).
8. 229 Minn. 516, 40 N.W.2d 342 (1949); see Comment, 34 MwN.
L. REV. 704 (1950); accord, First Nat'1 Bank v. First Trust Co., 242
Minn. 226, 64 N.W.2d 524 (1954).
9. See, e.g., Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936);
Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia v. Trust Co., 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.2d 691
(1942). See generally Comment, 57 MICH. L. REv. 781 (1958).
10. The statute applies to both federal and state estate taxes, and
provides for apportionment among both probate and nonprobate assets.
See N.Y. DEc. EST. LAW § 124 (McKinney Supp. 1966). See also
Comment, 34 MANx. L. REV. 704 (1950); Lauritzen, supra note 7, at 87.
11. Susman & Forticq, Apportionment of Death Taxes: A Com-
prehensive Survey with Proposed Statute, 45 TExAs L. REv. 1348, 1400
(1967).
12. The only significant difference between the statutes of the
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terpretation of statutes' 3 and the relevant case law14 indicate
that where a statute has been taken from another state the
construction of the courts of that state is presumed to be adopted
also. Therefore, New York case law is relevant to the under-
standing and application of the Minnesota apportionment statute.
The Minnesota apportionment statute provides that unless
the will of the testator directs otherwise, the estate tax bur-
den is to be apportioned among the beneficiaries of the estate
in the same proportion that the value of the property received
by each beneficiary bears to the total value of the property
received by all beneficiaries.'5 For example, suppose that X's
estate is distributed to A, B, and C as follows: A receives a
specific bequest of $50,000, B receives a life estate and remainder
in a nontestamentary trust valued at $100,000, and C receives
the remainder of the estate valued at $300,000. The total value
of the property received by the beneficiaries is $450,000. There-
fore, applying the apportionment statute, each would be assessed
the following proportion of the total federal estate tax- A-
1/9; B-2/9; and C-2/3.
In the absence of a direction in the will against the appli-
cation of the apportionment statute, the presumption is that its
provisions coincide with the testator's intent as to the estate tax
burden. The merits of the presumption include the reduction
of litigation on the issue of the tax burden when the testator has
not provided for it, more efficient administration of estates,
and a rule of certainty in estate planning. However, as in the
case of intestate succession statutes, the presumptive intent of
the statute will not always coincide with and may even be con-
trary to testator's actual intent.' 6 Thus, the testator may wish
two states is that the New York statute also applies to estate taxes of
the state of New York and other states and countries whereas the
Minnesota statute applies only to the federal estate tax. See MrNN.
STAT. §§ 525.521-.527 (1965); N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAw § 124 (McKinney Supp.
1966).
13. Mum. STAT. §§ 645.16-.17 (1965).
14. See, e.g., Minnesota Baptist Convention v. Pillsbury Academy,
246 Minn. 46, 53-54, 74 N.W.2d 286, 291 (1956); State v. Brooks, 181
Minn. 262, 266, 232 N.W. 331, 333 (1930). But see State v. Ritschel,
220 Minn. 578, 586, 20 N.W.2d 673, 677 (1945) (not bound by a state-of-
origin construction after adoption of statute).
15. Mixx. STAT. § 525.523 (1965). The statute includes nonpro-
bate as well as probate assets for the purpose of determining this pro-
portion. MfntN. STAT. § 525.521 (1965).
16. See Willoughby, Federal Estate Taxation-Testator's General
Direction Against Apportionment-Effect Upon Nonprobate Property, 46
ORE. L. REV. 199, 206 (1967), where the argument is made that testator
often misunderstands the law pertaining to apportionment and as a
1290 [Vol. 52:1288
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to direct against the statutory apportionment of estate taxes
in his will because he does not want to apportion the taxes.
Testator may also wish to direct against the apportion-
ment statute where his will contains a charitable or marital
devise or bequest because he desires no apportionment of taxes
among the residuary beneficiaries. The apportionment statute
provides that the charitable and marital deductions allowable
against the taxable estate shall inure to the benefit of the recipi-
ent of the deductible gift.1" Thus, when there is statutory ap-
portionment of the tax attributable to the residue and one of
the residuary beneficiaries is a charity, the charity will receive
the benefit of the charitable deduction and no tax will be appor-
tioned against its share of the residue. The entire residuary
tax burden will be apportioned among the other residuary bene-
ficiaries.18 In the absence of the statute, the residue after the
payment of taxes on the entire estate would be divided equally
among the residuary beneficiaries.
For example, assume that there are three residuary bene-
ficiaries, A, B, and C, and that the residuary estate of $30,000
is to be divided equally among them. Assume further that there
is $10,000 tax attributable to the residue. After payment of
taxes, therefore, the residue is $20,000. If the apportionment
statute is not applied, A, B, and C will each receive one-third of
$20,000. However, if there is apportionment, and A and B
are charities, they will each receive one-third of $30,000. The
entire tax attributable to the residue will fall on C's share, so
that he receives nothing.
This benefit which inures to the recipient of the deductible
gift under the apportionment statute may be desirable, how-
ever, when the marital deduction is applicable since de-
cedent often desires that his spouse receive the greatest benefit.
Moreover, the federal estate taxes due for the entire estate
may be reduced because of the increase in the marital deduc-
tion resulting from its exemption from the apportioned tax
burden.' The same tax benefit accrues to the entire estate
result makes inadequate provision for nonapportionment of nonprobate
assets. When the beneficiaries of such nonprobate assets are members
of the immediate family, they are often unintentionally burdened with
death taxes for the whole estate.
17. MinN. STAT. § 525.523 (1965). See Lewald v. United States,
245 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
18. In re Pratt's Estate, 33 Misc. 2d 300, 123 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Sur.
Ct. 1953).
19. The federal estate taxes may be reduced because the amount
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when the deductible gift is to a charity. Therefore, the testator
should weigh the desirability of the maximum estate tax deduc-
tions against his desire that all beneficiaries share in the estate,
achieved by a direction against apportionment among the re-
siduary beneficiaries. If testator decides to direct against the
apportionment statute to create apportionment in the above cir-
cumstance, or to prevent apportionment in the other circum-
stances, the drafter faces several problems in effectively directing
against the statute.
III. PROBLEMS IN DIRECTING AGAINST THE
APPORTIONMENT STATUTE
A. NONTESTAmENARY PROPERTY
As a general rule, a direction against apportionment must
be explicit and unambiguous, otherwise the direction may be
ineffective. For example, a provision in the will directing against
statutory apportionment generally will not be effective as to
nontestamentary property.20 The testator must explicitly state in
his will that the nonprobate assets are to be exonerated from
apportionment, 21 although no provision specifically referring to
each of the nonprobate assets need be included. Thus, in In re
Pergament's Estate,22 where decedent's will directed that the
taxes on the gross estate be paid out of residue,23 the court
found an ambiguity respecting the exoneration of an inter vivos
trust from payment of its pro rata share of taxes. The court
going to the spouse will be greater; thus, the amount of the marital de-
duction may be increased. Lewald v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 336
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). For an argument against the allowance of such bene-
fits inuring to the surviving spouse, see Lauritzen, supra note 7, at 85-87.
20. See Willoughby, supra note 16, at 206.
21. After the passage of the New York death tax apportionment in
1930, the New York courts interpreted general directions against appor-
tionment as referring to nonprobate as well as probate assets. E.g.,
In re Halle's Estate, 270 App. Div. 619, 61 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1946); In re
Greenwald's Estate, 186 Misc. 854, 53 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sur. Ct. 1945).
However, in 1950 the apportionment statute was amended with the ef-
fect of reversing the prior cases.
22. 29 Misc. 2d 334, 218 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sur. Ct.), aff'd, 19 App. Div.
2d 945, 245 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1961).
23. The clause involved in that case was as follows:
I direct and authorize my Executor or Executors to pay
from my residuary estate and all inheritance and other estate
transfer taxes or death duties that may be imposed or become
chargeable against my gross taxable estate; or against any of
the devises or bequests herein, it being my intention that each
and every devise and bequest under this will shall be delivered
to and be taken by every devisee of or legatee hereunder in
full and without any deduction for taxes.
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held, therefore, that the statutory direction to apportion taxes
against beneficiaries of the inter vivos trust was absolute.
24
Recent decisions indicate, however, that the attitude of the
courts toward apportionment of nontestamentary assets may be
changing.25 In In re Chodikoff's Estate,26 for example, a clause
directing the payment of all estate taxes out of residue exonerat-
ing all specific legatees and beneficiaries from tax liability was
held sufficient to exempt from apportionment a nontestamen-
tary gift of insurance to testator's wife, even though no reference
was made to such nontestamentary gift in the will. Further-
more, one court has indicated in dicta that a general direction
that estate taxes are to be paid out of residue will be sufficient
to exempt nontestamentary assets from statutory apportion-
ment.2
7
B. PROPERTY PASSING UNDER A CODICIL
When a testator executes a codicil, he will often intend
that any direction against statutory apportionment in his will
applies to the codicil also. However, unless the codicil itself con-
tains a direction against apportionment it is not clear that this
24. In In re Leonard's Estate, 16 Misc. 2d 465, 184 N.Y.S.2d 552
(Sur. Ct.), af'fd, 9 App. Div. 2d 1, 189 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1959), the court said
there was doubt as to whether testator meant to exonerate nontesta-
mentary property from apportionment when he directed in his will as
follows: "I direct my executors.., to pay all of my just debts, funeral
and administration expenses, including such estate and inheritance taxes
as may be assessed against my estate .... " The court held that the
nontestamentary property must be apportioned.
25. In re Pergament's Estate, 29 Misc. 2d 334, 218 N.Y.S.2d 831
(Sur. Ct.), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 945, 245 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1961). Although
the court found that there was no direction against apportionment of
nontestamentary assets, the court indicated that the general direction
against apportionment would have been effective with respect to non-
testamentary assets had the last part of the provision beginning "it
being my intention" been omitted. See clause quoted in note 23 supra.
26. 50 Misc. 2d 86, 270 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sur. Ct. 1966). Accord, In re
Lander's Estate, 416 Pa, 605, 207 A.2d 753 (1965).
27. In In re Schneider's Estate, 49 Misc. 2d 493, 267 N.Y.S.2d 852
(Sur. Ct. 1966), a general clause directing against apportionment was
held insufficient to exonerate nontestamentary property from appor-
tionment. The court indicated in dicta, however, that either of the fol-
lowing two clauses would be sufficient to exonerate nontestamentary
assets: (1) "My residuary estate is to pay the entire estate tax on my
gross taxable estate." (2) "My residuary estate is to pay all estate
taxes on my estate, or the gifts, legacies, devises and bequests set forth
under my will." See also In re Wheeler's Will, 19 lisc. 2d 335, 186
N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sur. Ct. 1959), affd without opinion, 14 App. Div. 2d 549,
219 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1961).
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intent will be satisfied. In In re Ballou's Estate,28 for example,
the testator's will provided that a certain legacy was to be ex-
empt from apportionment of taxes. The testator subsequently
executed a codicil to his will, changing the amount of the bequest.
Despite the obvious intent of the testator that only the amount
of the bequest be changed, the court held that the bequests of
the codicil were subject to statutory apportionment absent di-
rection against apportionment within the codicil.
More recent cases indicate that courts may be willing to
transfer the testator's intent as clearly expressed in the will to
the provisions of the codicil. Thus, the intent of the testator
with respect to apportionment was applied to the codicil in In
re Chodikoffs Estate,29 where the will directed against the appor-
tionment of specific bequests. A codicil to the will provided
for additional bequests without mention of apportionment. The
court followed the intent of the testator as declared in the will
and exonerated the bequests of the codicil from apportionment.
Nevertheless, it is always best to include a direction against ap-
portionment within the codicil if nonapportionment thereof is
desired.
C. RESIDUARY PROPERTY
The general rule as to the application of the apportionment
statute to the residuary estate is the same as that applicable to
all bequests: estate taxes will be apportioned among residuary
beneficiaries unless there is specific language in the will di-
recting against such apportionment. A general direction against
apportionment will not suffice.30  Statutory apportionment
among residuary beneficiaries is important when the fractional
share of residue which the residuary beneficiaries will receive
28. 206 Misc. 442, 132 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sur. Ct.), affd, 285 App. Div.
929, 139 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1954).
29. 50 Misc. 2d 86, 270 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sur. Ct. 1966).
30. The following provision in a -will exonerated a nonresiduary
bequest from taxes, but it was held not to be a direction against the
apportionment of taxes within the residuary estate:
[I direct that] every inheritance, transfer or legacy tax upon
or on account of any gift, bequest or devise made by me or any
right of inheritance or succession under this my Will under the
laws of the United States ... be paid out of my residuary
estate.
Lewald v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); accord, In re
Leonard's Estate, 16 Misc. 2d 465, 184 N.Y.S.2d 552, affd, 9 App. Div.
2d 1, 189 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1959); In re Rudin's Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 464
(1962). But see In re Wheeler's Will, 19 Misc. 2d 335, 186 N.Y.S.2d 134
(Sur. Ct. 1959), af'd, 14 App. Div. 2d 549, 219 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1961); In re
Lander's Estate, 416 Pa. 605, 207 A.2d 753 (1965).
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varies as a result of apportionment. For example, if the be-
quests include one which qualifies for the charitable or the
marital deduction, 31 the beneficiary of the deductible gift will
receive the maximum share, and the remaining residuary bene-
ficiaries must bear the entire tax burden of the residue.
There is also a problem where a will directs against appor-
tionment and states that estate taxes are to be paid from the
residuary estate, but the residuary estate is insufficient to pay the
estate taxes.3 2 In this situation, it has generally been held that
the testamentary direction against apportionment can have no
application in the construction of the will and, therefore, the
estate taxes are to be equitably prorated against all benefi-
ciaries.33
IV. EFFECTIVELY DIRECTING AGAINST
APPORTIONMENT
In the absence of explicit direction in the will to the con-
trary, the usual presumption is that strict application of the
apportionment statute was intended.34 In In re Shubert's Will,35
for example, the testator bequeathed the residue of his estate to
trustees to be divided into six "equal shares or portions," three
shares to charity and three to named beneficiaries for life with
31. E.g., In re Shubert's Will, 10 N.Y.2d 461, 225 N.Y.S.2d 13, 180
N.E.2d 410 (1962). Apportionment of the residue resulted where the
residuary estate was bequeathed to individual beneficiaries and a char-
itable foundation in "equal portions."
The fractional shares of the residuary beneficiaries also vary with
apportionment where one residuary beneficiary has received an inter
vivos gift which is to be taken into account in determining his share of
the residue. For example, assume that A, B, and C are the residuary
beneficiaries of a residue of $8,000. A has previously received an inter
vivos gift of $1,000, which is to be taken into account in determining
A's share. Assume further that estate taxes on the residue are $3,000.
If there is no apportionment, B and C receive $2,000 and A receives
$1,000 from the residue. This result provides equality since A has al-
ready received $1,000 as an inter vivos gift. But now assume that there
is apportionment among residuary beneficiaries. B and C each receive
$3,000 of residue and A receives $2,000. These amounts are taxable to
A, B, and C in accordance with the apportionment statute. Therefore,
A will pay 2/8 x $3,000, and B and C will each pay 3/8 x $3,000 for
taxes. Inequality results.
32. In re Goldman's Estate, 4 Misc. 2d 31, 153 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sur.
Ct. 1956); In re Homler's Will, 132 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
33. See cases cited note 32 supra.
34. For considerations relevant to allocating the burden of estate
taxes, see 2 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNIG 1134-35 (3d ed. 1961), and
Chambers, Estate Planning and the Estate Tax Apportionment Problem,
18 J. AM. Soc'y C.L.U. 155 (1964).
35. 10 N.Y.2d 461, 225 N.Y.S.2d 13, 180 N.E.2d 410 (1962).
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remainder to charity. Although it was apparent that the testa-
tor intended the beneficiaries to share equally in the residue,
the court gave effect to the strong presumption in favor of statu-
tory apportionment and held that estate taxes were to be appor-
tioned among the residuary legatees. In accordance with the
apportionment statute, the charity benefited from the charita-
ble deduction and received shares greater than those received
by the individuals. Thus, a provision for equality among lega-
tees is not an effective direction against apportionment.8
Moreover, an ambiguity in a clause directing against appor-
tionment is normally fatal to such direction.37 It is not clear,
however, what constitutes an explicit and unambiguous direction
against apportionment.3 8 A direction that all benefactions "be
paid and delivered in full and without deduction" has been held
effective to direct against apportionment. 9 Testamentary clauses
bequeathing the balance of the estate after the payment of es-
tate taxes, 40 or directing the executor to pay the debts, expenses,
36. The opposite view was taken in In re Cohen's Estate, 35
Misc. 2d 23, 229 N.Y.S.2d 340 (Sur. Ct. 1962), where the testator di-
rected the division of his general estate into twenty parts-three parts
left to charity and seventeen parts left as one trust with the income to
be divided into equal shares for certain life beneficiaries and the re-
mainder to pass to charity. Because of the difference in ages of the
life beneficiaries, the taxes attributable to each were different. There-
fore, the court decided there should be no apportionment among the
beneficiaries of the seventeen trusts because this would be contrary to
testator's intent to have the incomes be equal; thus the holding was that
"provisions for equality ... do amount to unambiguous directions
against apportionment." See In re Neider's Estate, 52 Cal. Rptr. 47
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Gesner v. Roberts, 88 N.J. Super. 278, 212 A.2d 43
(Ch. 1965).
37. In re Johnson's Will, 33 Misc. 2d 643, 227 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sur.
Ct. 1962). The clause: "I direct that all of my just debts, funeral ex-
penses and expenses in connection with the administration of my
estate be paid," was held an insufficient direction against apportion-
ment because there was no direction within the will that estate taxes
were meant to be included as an expense of administration.
38. The courts are primarily concerned with the intent of the testa-
tor, and thus may be willing to infer his intent from the remainder of
the will, In re Ogburn's Estate, 406 P.2d 655 (Wyo. 1965), or to look to
extrinsic evidence. In re Potter's Will, 43 Misc. 2d 409, 251 N.Y.S.2d 95
(Sur. Ct. 1964). But see In re Chodikoff's Will, 50 Misc. 2d 86, 270
N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sur. Ct. 1966). -
39. In re Hotaling's Estate, 74 Cal. App. 2d 808, 170 P.2d 111 (1946).
However, the will was executed prior to the operative date of the pro-
ration statute, and the testator was charged with knowledge of the law
only as it existed at the time he made his will.
40. Jarreau v. Jarreau, 184 So. 2d 762 (La. 1966). The Louisiana
death tax apportionment statute differs significantly from that of Min-
nesota. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. §§ 9:2431, 9:2432.
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and taxes assessed against the estate or any beneficiary have
been effective to direct against apportionment. 4' These clauses
have not, however, been effective in all cases.42  A direction
that all debts of the estate be paid out of the residue has been
held insufficient to direct against apportionment of the estate
tax43 and a clause directing the payment of the debts and ex-
penses of the estate has been held sufficient to direct against
apportionment of property passing under the will, but not to
direct against the apportionment of nontestamentary assets.44
Moreover, if a direction against apportionment is inconsistent
with another clause of the will,45 it probably will not be effec-
tive since the contrary provisions may make the direction against
apportionment ambiguous and, consequently, ineffective.
It is clear, therefore, that careful draftsmanship is neces-
sary to avoid the application of the apportionment statute.
Even when a testator desires apportionment of estate taxes
among the beneficiaries of his estate as provided by the statute,
it is advisable to so direct in the will in order to avoid litigation
of the issue and expedite the administration of the estate.46
The following are examples of clauses which should be included
in the will in order to insure the desired result: (1) nonappor-
tionment, (2) apportionment among all beneficiaries, (3) appor-
tionment only among residuary beneficiaries, (4) apportionment
only among beneficiaries of nontestamentary property, and (5)
exemption of certain bequests from apportionment.
(1) If a testator desires that there be no apportionment
41. In re Estate of Tedford, 258 Iowa 890, 140 N.W.2d 908 (1966).
42. A phrase which provided for payment of estate taxes "as may
be assessed against my estate" was held ineffective to direct against
apportionment in In re Leonard's Estate, 9 App. Div. 2d 1, 189 N.Y.S.2d
422 (1959). The court stated that, "[t]he necessity of a direction
against apportionment that will be both clear and unambiguous seems,
in reason, even stronger in the case of taxable transfers dehors the
instrument in which the supposed direction is sought. . . " Id. at 2,
189 l.Y.S.2d at 423. See also In re Cutler's Estate, 26 Misc. 2d 805,
209 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sur. Ct. 1960).
43. Naffziger v. Cook, 179 Neb. 264, 137 N.W.2d 804 (1965).
44. In re Ogburn's Estate, 406 P.2d 655 (Wyo. 1965).
45. In re Pepper's Estate, 307 N.Y. 242, 120 N.E.2d 807 (1954). The
court found that the testator had made two inconsistent dispositions of
his residuary estate: One clause disposed of all the residue by estab-
lishing trusts from it, and the other clause provided that the residue be
used to pay taxes which it considered a direction against apportionment.
Apparently it makes no difference whether the clause directing
against apportionment is prior to or subsequent to the clause with which
it is inconsistent. Id. at 250-51, 120 N.E.2d at 811.
46. See W. LEAcH, WILLs 289 (2d rev. ed. 1960). See also A.
CASNEiI, ESTATE PLANnG 897 (2d ed. 1956).
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of taxes among any beneficiaries, the will should include express
clauses which direct against apportionment of taxes on nontesta-
mentary and residuary property. Although general testamen-
tary direction against apportionment probably will not be effec-
tive as to these assets, the following clause might be used:
I direct my Executor to pay out of my residuary estate all es-
tate, inheritance, and succession taxes, together with interest
and penalties thereon, imposed with respect to any property,
whether disposed of by will or not and including my residuary
estate, on which these taxes are assessed. 47
(2) Where testator desires that there be apportionment
of the estate taxes among all beneficiaries, the statute will ac-
complish this result in the absence of an apportionment clause
in the will. In order to avoid problems of construction, how-
ever, the following clause might be employed:
I direct that all estate, inheritance, and succession taxes, to-
gether with interest and penalties thereon, which may be as-
sessed by reason of my death shall be paid in the first instance
by my Executor, but that the ultimate burden of these taxes
and charges shall be apportioned among, charged to, and col-
lected from the beneficiaries sharing in my gross taxable estate,
including beneficiaries receiving property outside of my pro-
bate estate. I hereby authorize my Executor to take such
action as may be necessary to collect these taxes and charges
from the beneficiaries responsible iherefor.48
(3) Where apportionment is desired only among residuary
beneficiaries, the following clause may be used:
I direct that all estate, inheritance, and succession taxes, to-
gether with interest or penalties thereon, which may be as-
sessed by reason of my death shall be paid in the first instance
by my Executor, but only those taxes applicable to nonprobate
assets and probate assets other than my residuary estate shall
be paid out of my residuary estate. Any such taxes assessed
by reason of property passing through my residuary estate shall
be apportioned among the persons receiving the benefit of such
property, and I hereby authorize my Executor to take such ac-
tion as may be necessary to collect these taxes and charges from
the beneficiaries responsible therefor.
(4) Similarly, where apportionment is desired only among
those who receive nontestamentary property, a provision such
as the following will suffice:
I direct that all estate, inheritance, and succession taxes, to-
gether with interest or penalties thereon, which may be as-
sessed by reason of my death shall be paid in the first instance
by my Executor, but only those taxes applicable to assets form-
ing my probate estate (including my residuary estate) shall be
47. See P. Coox, A. G.BERT & E. STOCKER, MANUAL FOR PREPARA-
TION OF WILLS AN ADmINmTRAT ON OF ESTATES 3N TEXAS 12-13 (1962);
Susman & Forticq, supra note 11, at 1358.
48. Id.
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paid out of my residuary estate. Any such taxes assessed by
reason of property passing outside my probate estate shall be
apportioned among the persons receiving the benefit of such
property, and I hereby authorize my Executor to take such ac-
tion as may be necessary to collect these taxes and charges from
the beneficiaries responsible therefor.
(5) If testator desires that there be apportionment among
all except for the objects of certain bequests, a clause similar
to the immediately preceding clause should be used, explicitly
directing the bequests which are to be exonerated from the
tax burden. Moreover, if testator adds a codicil to the will, the
codicil itself should contain an express provision dealing with
the allocation of taxes.
V. CONCLUSION
The courts have taken a rather "hard stand" on applying
the apportionment statute whenever an ambiguity existed in a
will provision directing against apportionment. To be certain
of an effective direction against apportionment there must be no
other provisions in the will which conflict with such direction
and the direction itself must clearly express what is being ex-
onerated from which taxes and to whom the tax burden is
shifted.4 9 If apportionment of nonprobate assets, residuary as-
sets, or assets disposed of under a codicil is not desired, a spe-
cific clause directing against apportionment of each group of
these assets should be included in the will. There is support
for the position that a general clause such as "My residuary es-
tate is to pay the entire estate tax on my gross taxable estate"
will be effective to direct against apportionment of everything
but residuary assets. However, it is best to direct against statu-
tory apportionment and to provide for the ultimate tax burden
according to the intent of the testator, in order to avoid the
statutory presumption of intent to have apportionment. 50
49. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 7, 9-10 (1954).
50. In re Agris' Estate, 3 Misc. 2d 821, 155 N.Y.S.2d 296 (Sur. Ct.
1956). In this case the apportionment tended to work to the disad-
vantage of residuary beneficiaries. The court stated that even though
the statute was enacted primarily to benefit the residuary beneficiar-
ies by equitably prorating the burden, it could not find against appor-
tionment where no reference to it existed in the will. Tax appor-
tionment is mandatory as the declared statutory policy unless the testa-
tor expressly directs otherwise.
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